Happiness/Contentment
We easily recognize that some things are valuable primarily as they serve as means to other goods or ends: so, commonly, many students value their education as an extrinsic good – that is, something that is valuable as a means to achieving some other good, such as a job, a high salary, etc. But these in turn may be simply extrinsic goods – that is, goods that are likewise valuable not so much in themselves (e.g., few of us – unfortunately – think of our work as an intrinsic good, as something worthwhile in itself, whether or not we are paid for it). So it seems that, somewhere, the chain of justifications for extrinsic goods must come to a rest at an intrinsic good – something that is simply worthwhile in and of itself. Or else, as Aristotle famously argued, we are faced with an infinite regress of an extrinsic good being justified by a further extrinsic good, etc. Then the difficulty becomes one of finding such an intrinsic good – indeed, one that all of us would agree is valuable in and of itself. But, as Aristotle further argued, eudaimonia – often translated as “happiness,” but better translated as “contentment” – is a good we all recognize as intrinsically valuable. That is, we may well ask someone why they want to attend university – i.e., what further good justifies such attendance if she or he believes that attending university is only an extrinsic good. But we don’t seem to need to ask why someone would want to be happy or content: that is, happiness or contentment appears to be good in itself, and thus does not require further justification as a means to some further end.
